Corporate Income Taxes, Valuation, and the Problem of Optimal Capital Structure
Shareholders can decide if their corporation issues risky or risk-free debt. We identify tax systems in which the choice between risky and risk-free debt is not distorted by taxes. These credit default neutral tax systems make it possible to make capital structure decisions and firm valuations neglecting credit default risk, even after taxes. Thus credit default neutrality is a characteristic of a tax system that helps to reduce planning costs. Moreover, credit default neutrality is a necessary condition for financial neutrality of taxation. We find one class of credit default neutral taxes that preserves and another class that modifies the expected tax distribution between creditors and debtor firm. Finally, we show the influence of personal taxation on credit default neutrality.Empirical findings are mixed about the performance of structural models for term structure of credit spreads. It is commonly believed that all structural models have equally poor performance after calibration. However, proper calibration is not a trivial issue, especially for highly structural models. This paper proposes a more accurate procedure for calibrating two models: Leland–Toft (J Finance 51:987–1019, 1996) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (J Finance 56:2177–2208, 2001). Using rating-based bond data, we find that the Leland–Toft model has significantly greater explanatory power for credit spreads across rating categories than previously reported. We provide theoretical explanations for these findings, and further extend our empirical analysis to include 286 individual senior bonds. Our findings help clarify the controversies over the performance of structural models in general and that of the Leland–Toft model in particular. In addition, we offer a rigorous procedure that can be used for calibrating other structural models more effectively.
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This paper develops a theory of a firm’s hedging decision with endogenous leverage. In contrast to previous models in the literature, our framework is based on less restrictive distributional assumptions and allows a closed-form analytical solution to the joint optimization problem. Using anecdotal evidence of greater benefits of risk management for firms selling “credence goods” or products that involve long-term relationships, we prove that those optimally leveraged firms, which face more convex indirect bankruptcy cost functions, will choose higher hedge ratios. Moreover, we suggest a new approach to test this relationship empirically.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 5th Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research (SGF), at the 9th Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association (DGF), at the 2004 Basel Meeting of the European Financial Management Association (EFMA), the 2005 WHU Campus for Finance Conference on Options and Futures, the 12th Global Finance Conference (GFC) in Dublin, the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Northern Finance Association (NFA) in Vancouver and at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Eastern Finance Association (EFA) in Philadelphia. We especially appreciate the valuable comments of Tim R. Adam, Axel F. A. Adam-Müller, Rakesh Bharati, René Garcia, Amrit Judge, Olaf Korn, Gunter Löffler, Lars Norden, Larry D. Wall, Josef Zechner and two anonymus RQFA referees. Of course, any remaining errors are our own.
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This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.
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